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Case No. 7705 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
'0. K. CLAY, Administrator of the 
·Estate of Arnold Kartchner, als.o 
lplown as Arnold G. Kartchner, and 
.Arnold Grant Kartchner, Deceased, 
Plai,.tif! a;nd, .Appellant, 
vs. 
Bt!PHEN L. DUNFORD, PAUL H. 
·$~EVENS, BURNS L. DUNFORD 
and L. CLAYTON DUNFORD, 
d/b/a ·The Dunford Bread Co., 
f!efendants am.il Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
RRETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
. \ "( ~ lJlmiSTENSEN, V J..A , gt=']. Attorneys for DefrmilomJs 
· · ft.'O 2 J \ - _ .......... ..cwll Respondents . 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
0. I\::. l'LA Y, ~\dministrator of the 
E~tate of ~lrnold ICartchner, also 
known as Arnold G. ICartchner, and 
~lrnold Grant Kartchner, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v~. 
STEPHEX L. DrXFORD, PAUL H. 
STEYEXS, BrRNS L. DUNFORD 
and L. CLAYTON DUNFORD, 
djbja The Dunford Bread Co., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
7705 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendants and respondents petition this Honorable 
Court for a rehearing in the above entitled case for the 
following grounds and reasons : 
1. This Honorable Court failed to pass upon and 
determine all questions of law involved in the case pre-
sented upon the appeal and necessary to the final deter-
Inination of the case contrary to the provisions of Rule 
76 (a) U.R.C.P. 
2. This Honorable Court erred in holding that the 
instruction on assumption of risk was prejudicial error. 
3. This Honorable Court ·erred in failing to hold 
that there was no evidence in the record to warrant a 
finding that any negligence upon the part of the defen-
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2 
dants' driver was the proximate cause of the accident. 
4. This Honorable Court erred in failing to hold 
that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law barring any recovery in this action. 
WHEREFORE, respondents pray that this Court 
make and enter an order setting aside the opinion and 
decision of this Court, made and filed on the 24th day of 
January, 1952, and that it order a rehearing of the above 
entitled case, and upon rehearing that it make and enter 
its order affirming the judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In filing this petition for rehearing we are fully 
cognizant that petitions for rehearing are granted with 
reluctance and only when the Court is convinced that 
some salient point has been o:verlooked or that it has 
committed serious error. We realize that the Court can 
never convince losing counsel that he is not entitled to 
prevail. Likewise we realize that the Court does not 
have the time to decide every case twice. We are in full 
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sympathy with the rule which denies a rehearing except 
in the 1uost tmusual case. It is not our practice to file 
petitions for rehearing, and this petition is filed and 
urged upon the Court only in the sincere belief that the 
Court has fallen into grave error, and that the Court 
has con1pletely overlooked and wholly failed to consider 
two very important points raised by the respondents in 
their original brief. \Vith these considerations in mind 
we proceed to a discussion of the various points upon 
which our petition is based. 
POINT I. 
_ ~ THIS COURT FAILED TO PASS UPON AND DETER-
MINE ALL QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED IN THE CASE 
PRESENTED UPON THE APPEAL AND NECESSARY TO 
THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE CASE, CONTRARY 
TO THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 76 (a) U.R.C.P. 
Rule 76 (a) U.R.C.P. provides in part as follows: 
"If a new trial is granted the Court shall 
pass upon and determine all questions of law 
involved in the case presented upon the appeal 
and necessary to the final determination of the 
case." (Italics ours). 
The reason for this rule is obvious. Where several 
points of law are presented upon appeal, and the Court 
determines that a new trial should be granted because 
of prejudicial error occurring at the first trial, it is to 
the advantage of both parties as well as to both the trial 
court and the appellate court that all questions of law 
be laid to rest at one time. Failure of the Court to rule 
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upon all questions of law presented will result In the 
probability of the same questions being presented in a 
subsequent appeal of the same case. This is costly in 
both time and money to litigants and costly also in the 
time of the court. 
In the case at bar, this Court has apparently over-
looked the provisions of this rule. Three points were 
raised by the appellant upon his appeal and two addi-
tional points were raised by the respondents in their 
brief. All of thes.e issues of law must be resolved, in 
order that this case may be finally determined. Under 
the rule above quoted, both parties are entitled to have 
these issues determined at this time by this Court. Fail-
ure upon the part of the Court to determine these ques-
tions at this time will give rise to the definite possibility 
of a subsequent appeal by one party or the other involv-
ing the same questions. The undesirability of this we 
think will be readily apparent to the Court. 
In his brief on appeal appellant relied upon three 
points: First, appellant complained of the Court's in-
struction on assumption of risk. This issue, and this 
issue only, this Court determined. 
Second, appellant complained of the Court's instruc-
tion on contributory negligence. While appellant did not 
question that the respondents were entitled to an in-
struction on contributory negligence, he did urge that 
the instruction given did not correctly state the law and 
was too favorable to the respondents. Both parties to 
this action are entitled to a ruling from this Court as 
to the correctness of this instruction, since the matter 
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will undoubtedly be presented in a retrial of the case. 
If the instruction correctly stated the law then the re-
spondent is entitled to have the same instruction given 
at the retrial of this action. On the other hand, if the 
instruction does not correctly state the law this Court 
should point out wherein it is deficient so that the trial 
court can properly instruct the jury when the case is 
again tried. 
Third, appellant also complained that the Court 
failed to give an instruction requested by him. If the 
appellant was entitled to such an instruction this Court 
should so declare so that the trial judge will be properly 
guided in considering requests for instructions at the 
second trial. Contrariwise if the appellant was not 
entitled to such an instruction this Court should so 
declare so that the trial judge will not be led into error 
by any similar request that may be made by appellant 
at the retrial. 
Besides the points raised by the appellant in his 
brief the respondent raised two additional points as 
grounds for affirmance of the judgment. In view of the 
fact that this court reversed the judgment of the trial 
court, there is an implied holding that these points were 
without merit. However, there is nothing in either the 
prevailing opinion, written by Mr. Justice Henriod, or in 
the concurring opinion, written by Chief Justice Wolfe, 
which indicates that the two points raised by respondent 
were even considered by the Court. These two points 
will be fully discussed in a subsequent portion of our 
brief so we shall not dwell upon them here. Suffice it 
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to say that the Court has failed to consider and deter-
mine all of the issues of law presented by the parties, 
and unless those issues are now determined by the Court 
there is a very good possibility that both parties will 
be put to additional time and expense in relitigation of 
the very same questions which the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure specifically declare must be determined at 
this time. 
POINT II. 
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK WAS PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR. 
In its decision this Court held that the trial Court's 
instruction on assumption of risk was prejudicial error, 
and on this ground the Court reversed the judgment 
below and ordered a new trial. On this petition for re-
hearing we do not ask the court to review its holding 
that the giving of such an instruction was technical error. 
However, we do believe, and we do now contend that 
the error was purely technical and could not have re-
sulted in any prejudice to the appellant. We· think there 
can he no question as to the correctness of the instruction, 
as an abstract proposition of law. It was taken prac-
tically verbatim from a well recognized and frequently 
quoted text book. 38 Am. J ur. 856; Negligence, Sec. 171. 
The instruction would have been an equally correct state-
ment of law had the second paragraph been worded to 
read as follows: 
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"If you find frmn the evidence in this case 
that the deceased, Arnold Kartchner, placed him-
self in a position of obvious peril when there was 
no reasonable justification therefor, then the said 
~\rnold Kartchner is deemed to have been guilty 
of contributory negligence, and your verdict must 
be in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff no cause of action." 
The suggested amendinent to the instruction merely 
changes the technical designation of the defense from 
that of assumption of risk to that of contributory negli-
gence. It could make no difference to the jury what 
appellation the Court applied to the defense. If there 
was evidence to support the premises upon which the 
instruction was based, and the same legal result would 
follow regardless of the name applied to the defense, 
any technical error would be wholly immaterial and 
harmless. 
That the deceased placed himself in a position of 
obvious peril would seem to be too clear to admit of any 
dispute. At the time deceased alighted from his station 
wagon the defendant's truck was closely approaching 
on the right hand side of the road, and its presence was 
perfectly obvious to anyone who looked. There is noth-
ing in the record to indicate that there was any reason 
or excuse whatsoever for the deceased to alight on the 
left hand side toward the 13th South traffic. So far as 
the record shows, he could have, with equal facility and 
much greater safety, alighted from the right hand side 
of his station wagon and onto the sidewalk. That it is 
contributory negligence for a peTson to step from a place 
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of safety directly into the path of approaching traffic 
is a well established principle. A large number of cases 
in support of the rule are cited in our original brief, 
and additional cases will be found cited under Point IV 
hereof. 
There could have been no prejudice to the appellant 
in the giving of this instruction. The jury could have 
well found that the deceased placed himself in a position 
of obvious peril and that there was no reasonable justi-
fication therefor. In fact, under the evidence we do not 
see how the jury could have found any differently. On 
such a finding the deceased would have been guilty of 
contributory negligence barring any recovery. The fact 
that the jury was erroneously advised that this defense 
was assumption of risk instead of contributory negli-
gence could not possibly affect the outcome of the liti-
gation. 
POINT III. 
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
HOLD THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
TO WARRANT A FINDING THAT ANY NEGLIGENCE 
UPON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT'S DRIVER WAS 
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
At the trial of the case, defendants moved for a 
directed verdict on the grounds that there was no evi-
dence that any negligence on the part of the defendants 
caused the accident, and that the deceased was guilty 
of contributory negligence· as a matter of law. If we 
were correct in our position on either of these grounds 
then there was nothing for the jury to decide and any 
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and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
In our original brief, commencing on page 25, we 
atte1npted to point out to the Court that the plaintiff 
had wholly failed to sustain the burden of proving that 
the deceased's fatal injuries were proximately caused 
by any negligence upon the part of the defendant's 
driver. Apparently this point has not been considered 
by the Court. In the opinion of the court, there is not 
so much as a bare recital that the point has been con-
sidered and found to be without merit. We do not see 
how the Court, with any due consideration to that argu-
ment and to the many authorities cited in support there-
of, could possibly fail to find merit in the argument. 
It would seem that the court should at least take the 
time and trouble to point out why it does not follow the 
very respectable weight of authority cited in support 
of the argument. It is interesting to note that the appel-
lant in his reply brief did not even attempt to answer 
this argument. He has not cited so much as a single case 
or text book contrary to the position advanced by us. 
No rule of law is better settled than that the plain-
tiff in a personal injury or wrongful death action has 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the accident and the injuries or death result-
ing therefrom were proximately caused by some negli-
g~nce chargeable to the defendant. The record in this 
case is entirely barren of any evidence which would war-
rant or support a finding that the fatal injuries sus-
tained by the deceased were caused by any· negligence 
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upon the part of the defendant. The only evidence in 
the case which in anywise suggests that the defendant's 
driver was negligent at all was the testimony of a neigh-
bor of deceased, to the effect that some days after the 
accident she heard the driver say to the family of the 
deceased that he was not looking. This testimony was 
flatly contradicted by the defendants' driver who denied 
that he made any such statement, and who testified posi-
tively that he was looking straight ahead. However, let 
it be assumed that the defendants' driver was not keep-
ing a proper lookout. There is not one shred of evidence 
in the record which would warrant a finding that such 
failure to keep a proper lookout was a causative factor 
in producing this accident. The evidence is all to the 
effect that immediately upon his alighting from his 
automobile the deceased was struck. There is no evidence 
whatsoever that the deceased alighted from his auto-
Inobile sufficiently in advance of the defendants' oncom-
ing truck that the driver of the truck could have, with 
the utmost vigilance, avoided the accident. Let it be 
remembered by the Court that at the point of impact 
the truck was moving away from the station wagon, and 
that the impact was not upon the front of the truck but 
upon the side of the truck. The evidence points irresist-
ibly and inevitably to the conclusion that the deceased 
stepped backward into the truck. It is not the burden 
of the defendants in this case to prove freedom from 
negligence; rather it is the burden of the plaintiff to 
prove negligence and proximate cause. We challenge 
counsel for the appellant to point to any place in the 
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record where there is any evidence fr01n which a jury 
could find that the defendants' driver could have avoided 
striking deceased after he alighted from the station 
wagon. There is no evidence whatsoever that the de-
ceased alighted from his station wagon sufficiently in 
advance of the approach of the defendants' truck that 
the defendants' driver could have avoided him in the 
exercise of due care. Although the defendant's truck 
was not on the n1ain traveled portion of the highway, 
it was on the roadway where the driver had a right to 
be, and other persons desiring to make use of the road-
way had a duty to anticipate his presence and pay heed 
to it. We cited in our original brief on pages 28 and 29 
many similar cases wherein it was held that there was 
no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants. 
In addition to the cases there cited we invite the attention 
of the Court to the case of Bucilli v. Shanahan, 266 Pa. 
342, 109 Atl. 634. See also 2A Blashfield, Cyclopedia of 
Automobile Law and Practice, 122, Sec. 1242, where it 
is said: 
"On the other hand the driver of a motor 
vehicle is not ordinarily liable if a pedestrian 
without exercising due care for his own safety 
suddenly steps into the path of a moving machine 
from a place of safety." 
~t In the case of Chipokas v. Peterson, 219 Ia. 1072, 
[~ 260 N.vV. 37, cited in our original brief at page 28, the 
~~ facts are very similar to those of the case at bar. There 
0 the defendant was driving twenty to twenty-five miles 
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an hour and in the case at bar he was driving twenty 
miles per hour. There the plaintiff ran from behind a 
parked car whereas here the deceased stepped from 
inside a parked car. In neither case did the defendant 
ever see the injured pedestrian before the accident. 
In the Iowa case the accident occurred in a residential 
district. Although the evidence in the case at bar is 
not clear on the question, the accident here apparently 
occurred in a residential district. In that case the car 
was parked one foot from the curb line; in the instant 
case there was no curb line but the station wagon was 
parked one foot from the sidewalk. In the Chipokas 
case the point of impact was about thirteen feet from 
the curb. In the instant case the point of impact was 
about nine feet from the sidewalk. In holding that there 
was no evidence of negligence upon the part of the 
defendant the Supreme Court of Iowa said: 
"The negligence claimed here is that Peter-
son failed to maintain a proper look-out and to 
have his car under control, and that he violated 
an ordinance of the city of Cedar Rapids pro-
hibiting driving of cars in the residential districts 
in excess of a speed of 25 miles an hour. Peterson 
(defendant) himself testified that he did not see 
the child, and this is easily understood, for the 
distance from the west curb line of the street to 
the spot where the child was struck is a little 
more than 13 feet. She either ran in front or in 
back of the car that was parked, and this car was 
parked about a foot from the curb line. The width 
of the car was approximately six feet. This would 
take up seven feet of the street, leaving only six 
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feet in which this youngster was running when 
Peterson caine along. * * * All the other evidence 
:shows that Peterson was driving between 20 and 
~3 Iniles an hour. r_rrue, he did not sound the horn 
or give warning, but there was no reason for 
doing so because he did not see the youngster. 
And as the child darted out from in front or in 
back of the parked car, he had no opportunity 
of seeing her. The scene of the accident was not 
at a crossing or intersection. Peterson was not 
guilty of negligence just because this child, un-
fortunately, suddenly and unexpectedly ran out 
into the path of his auto. This no doubt, was the 
view of the jury in the former case, in which the 
same evidence was submitted, and in which the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Peterson. 
"Peterson had no opportunity to see this child 
in time to have prevented this accident. He was 
not driving at an excessive speed. * * * The appel-
lant has failed to prove that Peterson was guilty 
of negligence. This was one of the essential ele-
ments of his case. The lower court was right in 
directing the verdict, and the same must be, and 
it is hereby, affirmed." (Italics ours). 
The language of the Iowa court would appear to be 
applicable with equal force to the case at bar . 
., See also the language of the court in Gavin v. Jacobs, 
259 :L\Iass. 23, 155 K.E. 926: 
"The evidence in its aspect most favorable 
to the plaintiff tended to show that the plaintiff's 
intestate, riding on the back of an ice wagon, 
dropped off the back of the ice wagon and was 
almost immediately struck by the defendant's 
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automobile. There is no evidence to support a 
finding of negligence on the part of the defendant. 
His speed was not excessive, and there is nothing 
to indicate that he could have forseen that the 
plaintiff's intestate would be in contact with his 
automobile. It is manifest also that the accident 
could not have occurred if the plaintiff's intestate 
had used the care reasonably to be expected of a 
child of his years." 
POINT IV. 
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
HOLD THAT THE DECEASED WAS GUILTY OF CONTRI-
HUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW BARRING 
ANY RECOVERY IN THIS ACTION. 
The point upon which we most strongly rely in this 
case is that the deceased was, as a matter of law, guilty 
of contributory negligence. So far as appears from the 
opinion of the court, this point has been completely over-
looked. Commencing at page 30 of our original brief 
we cited case after case where it was held under facts 
similar to those in the case at bar that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence barring his recovery. 
The rule appears to be universal. In our extensive re-
search on this question we have yet to find a single case 
closely similar on its facts wherein a plaintiff has been 
permitted to recover where he has stepped from a place 
of safety without any observation whatsoever immedi-
ately into the path of an oncoming vehicle. Not only 
has the rule found universal acceptance by the courts 
and text writers, but it has actually been codified in the 
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law of this state. Section 57-7-1-l-:2 U.C.A. 19-t-:3, provides, 
in part, a~ follows: 
"* * * no pedestrian shall suddenly leave a 
curb or otl1er place of safety and walk or run 
into the path of a vehicle which is so close that 
it is in1possible for the driver to yield." (Italics 
ours). 
The preYailing opinion of the court in the case at 
bar closes with this sentence: 
'"Although the peril was obvious to anyone 
who looked and saw, as did the motorist who 
witnessed the tragedy, it seems equally obvious 
that the deceased did not look, did not see, did 
not appreciate and did not voluntarily place him~ 
self in the path of a known danger, and hence 
could not be charged with assumption of the risk." 
(Italics ours). 
"\Vith this statement we agree wholeheartedly. We 
do not know how the Court could have stated more clearly 
or more emphatically that the deceased was guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. Neither 
counsel for the appellant nor this Court has suggested 
any reason why the rule devolving upon all persons 
making use of the highways to observe for other traffic 
on the highway should not apply to the deceased in this 
case. In his reply brief appellant suggested that the 
general rule applied only in commercial districts where 
traffic is heavy almost to the point of congestion. N oth-
ing could be further from the truth. If this court has 
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been mislead by this suggestion, unsupported by either 
reason or authority, let us hasten to point out that in 
Inany of the cases cited in our original brief the accident 
occurred elsewhere than in the business district of a 
large city. In Woods v. Moore (Mo. App.), 48 S.W. (2d) 
202, cited at page 32 of our original brief, the accident 
occurred in a rural district. In Cooper and Co. v. Am. 
Can Co., 130 Me. 76, 153 Atl. 889, cited at page "35 of 
our brief, the accident occurred in a sparsely settled 
section on a country road. In Mingus v. Olsson (Ut.), 
201 Pac. (2d) 495, the accident occurred in a residential 
section of Salt Lake City. In Deal v. Snyder, 203 :Mich. 
273, 168 N.W. 973, cited in our original brief at page 
37, the accident occurred in a farming district. In Letts 
v. Cole, 310 Pa. 509, 165 Atl. 847, cited in our original 
brief at p. 37, the accident occurred in a country borough. 
In Koock v. Goodnight (Tex. Civ App.), 71 S.W. (2d) 
927, cited at page 38 of our original brief, the accident 
occurred on a highway between towns. In Jarvis v. 
Stone, 216 Ia. 27, 247 N.W. 393, cited at page 38 of our 
original brief, the accident occurred on a road three 
miles out of town. In Ponder v. Carroll, 193 Ark. 1120, 
105 S.W. (2d) 72, cited in our original brief at page 38, 
the accident occurred outside of town. In Rittle v. Zeller, 
100 Pa. Sup. Ct. 516, cited at page 38 of our original 
brief, the accident occurred in open country. In James 
v. Florios, 248 l\lich. 153, 226 N.W. 852, cited in our 
original brief at page 28, the accident occurred at the 
western city limits of Detroit. In the following addi-
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tional cases the accident occurred other than in the busi-
ness section of a city: 
Heath Y. Klostennan (Pa.), 23 Atl. (2d) 209 
(residential district) ; 
Hill v. Lappley, 199 :l\Iich. 369, 165 N.W. 657 
(country highway); 
Gremillion v. Couvillion, 5 La. App. 441 (Church 
district); 
Yalanda Y. Baum and Reissman, Inc., 113 Fed. 
(:2d) 188 (outlying and unbuilt up portion of 
borough). 
In his reply brief appellant cited Ketchum v. Pattee 
(Cal. App.), 98 Pac. (2d) 1051, and Stricklin v. Rose-
meyer (Cal. App.), 142 Pac. (2d) 953. Neither case is 
helpful to the appellant's position. The basis of the 
Ketchum decision was that there was evidence that the 
plaintiff was not yet out of the car when the collision 
occurred, but was partly in the car and partly on the 
running board. The implication of the opinion is that 
if the plaintiff had alighted from his car prior to the 
occurrence of the accident the holding would be different. 
The Stricklin case, insofar as it has any relevance to 
the case at bar, supports the position of the respondents 
and not that of the appellant. It was there held that 
it was proper to instruct that where a person has a 
choice of two ways of performing an act, one of which 
is safe and the other of which he knows or should know 
is subject to danger, and such person chooses the danger-
ous way and as a proximate result thereof is injured, 
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such person is guilty of contributory negligence. The 
court said at page 955 : 
"On the application of the rule it has been 
frequently stated that the 'question' is whether 
the plaintiff knew that one way was safe and the 
other dangerous and chose the latter with full 
knowledge of those conditions. Here the appel-
lant concedes that he had such knowledge and 
that the chosen way was in fact dangerous. It is 
a matter of common knowledge that sidewalks 
are maintained for the safety of pedestrians and 
that they are ordinarily less dangerous to the 
pedestrians than the traveled portion of vehicle 
highways." 
In his original brief appellant conceded that it would 
have been safer for the deceased to have alighted onto 
the sidewalk rather than onto the road. The fact that 
deceased was unaware of the approach of defendants' 
truck cannot excuse him. The slightest glance to his rear 
and the slightest thought for his own safety would have 
avoided this accident. 
It has also been suggested by counsel for the appel-
lant that the rule of contributory negligence applies only 
in the cases of pedestrians attempting to cross a street 
from behind cars, but that it finds no application in the 
case of persons alighting from parked automobiles 
toward the street. It is manifest that counsel has not 
examined the authorities. The rule applies with equal 
force to persons alighting from automobiles. It is so 
laid down in 5 Am. J ur. 610, Automobiles, Sec. 191, cited 
at page 30 of our original brief. The case of Will v. 
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Boston Elerated Railroad ComJJany, 247 :Mass. 250, 
1-!2 N.E. -!-!, cited and discussed at pages 34-35 of our 
original brief also involved a pedestrian alighting frmn 
an automobile. The facts in that case were very similar 
to those in the case at bar. The following additional 
cases also involve pedestrians alighting from auto-
mobiles, trucks and trolleys : 
In Hill v. Lappley, 199 :Mich. 369, 165 N.W. 657, 
the plaintiff, a 17 year old woman, descended from the 
back of a truck which was parked on the right side of a 
country lz iglzway. She looked to the rear before alight-
ing but after alighting, without looking again, she took 
three or four steps and was almost instantly struck by 
defendant's car. In denying recovery the Supreme Court 
of :Jiichigan said : 
"It is obvious, I think from all the testimony, 
that plaintiff nwst unfortunately stepped into the 
highway directly in front of the defendant's car. 
The most ordinary care on her part should have 
prevented her from so doing. She cannot impose 
upon him consequ,ences for which she was in part 
responsible." (Italics ours). 
In Goff v. Borough of College Hill, 299 Pa. 343, 
149 Atl. 477, the plaintiff was injured alighting from an 
automobile parked along side the street when he was 
struck by a truck approaching from the rear. The court 
held plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. We quote from the opinion of the court 
as follows: 
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"Goff, a very large man and familiar with 
the street, was alighting from his car without 
looking for approaching traffic and did not see 
either the truck or the Studebaker until the 
instant he was struck. Had he glanced to the 
south, he would have seen the near approach of 
the large truck, so close in line with the left side 
of his car as to leave a clearance of not more 
than two feet. 
"In our opinion plaintiff was guilty of such 
contribntory negligence as to bar a recovery 
against either defendant. As the automobile traf-
fic upon paved streets is becoming more extensive, 
the duty of a party to look before entering a 
cartway becomes more important. We have never 
departed from the rule stated in Harris v. Com-
mercial Ice Co., 153 Pa. 78, 25 A. 1133, that one 
who steps into a busy street, and is immediately 
struck by a passing vehicle, which he could have 
seen had he looked, cannot recover. * **One who 
steps from a vehicle into the cartway of a busy 
street regardless of the condition of approaching 
traffic therein is negligent. * * * What plaintiff 
did in the present case, was not to step from the 
curb into the cartway, but to step therein from 
the street side of his car. * * * We do not doubt 
his right to alight from his car into the street, 
but before doing so it was his duty to look for 
approaching vehicles. Here, plaintiff could have 
seen the near approach of the large truck; coming 
along so close as to clear his car by only two 
feet, and stepping down so near in its path was 
negligence." (Italics ours). 
In Bucilli v. Shanahan, 266 Pa. 342, 109 Atl. 634, 
the deceased stepped from the left side of a truck 
parked along the right hand curb and was immediately 
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struck and killed by the defendants' truck. The court 
held there was no evidence of neglect on the part of 
defendants and added that the deceased's own contribu-
tory negligence barred recovery. To the same effect see 
Hall v. Freaney, 3-!5 Pa. -l5, 26 Atl. (2d) 45-l; also 
ralanda v. Bmun and Reissman, Inc., 113 Fed. (2d) 188. 
A case very similar on its facts to the case at bar 
is Heath v. Klosterman (Pa.), 23 Atl. (2d) 209. The 
facts were stated in the opinion of the court as follows: 
"The accident happened in broad daylight 
* * * immediately in front of Dr. Heath's (de-
ceased's) residence. * * * The house was on the 
right side of the highway, * * * the doctor's auto, 
headed in the same direction, was then parked in 
front of his house. Dr. Heath was in the act of 
alighting from its left door or had just stepped 
down upon the road, when he was struck by a 
truck owned and operated by one Charles R. 
:Jiartin. According to 1\;lartin, who was the only 
eye witness produced by plaintiff, the door of 
the car suddenly swung open and the doctor step-
ped out when the truck was almost up to the rear 
wheel of his auto, and he was struck almost 
instantly. Martin said he was then driving at 
approximately 20 miles an hour." 
In denying recovery the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania said: 
"The testimony leads to the inevitable con-
clusion, that the real cause of the unfortunate 
accident was the heedless act of Dr. Heath him-
self. As shown by positive proof produced by 
plaintiff, the door of his car was suddenly pushed 
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open and he stepped into the roadway of this 
much traveled boulevard without thought or care 
of traffic. The Martin truck was almost upon him 
at that nwment and he was struck almost instant-
aneously. Had he only looked before leaving his 
car in this manner, he would have seen the two 
trucks and he could have avoided the accident. 
Where a person steps into a position of danger 
in the street, and is immediately struck by a pass-
ing vehicle, which he could have seen had he look-
ed, he is barred from recovery by his own negli-
gence. [Citations omitted]. Even though Dr. 
Heath is dead and ordinarily a presumption might 
arise that he exercised due care, this presumption 
is destroyed in the instant case by the testimony 
adduced by plaintiff. * ~ * This conclusively ap-
peared in the presentation of plaintiff's own case, 
for the evidence established that Dr. Heath did 
not look. Moreover, the accident having happened 
in broad daylight, he must have seen the trucks 
had he looked before stepping out. There can be 
no presumption as against facts which are proven. 
* =II< * 
"\Ve are forced to conclude that Dr. Heath 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law. * * * What Dr. Heath did in the instant 
case was not to step from the curb into the cart-
way, but to step therein from the street side of 
his auto, totally oblivious of traffic then approach-
ing him. * * *While a person has a right to alight 
from his auto onto the cartway, it is his duty to 
look and continue to look for approaching traffic 
when doing so. He must exercise reasonable care 
under the circumstances. For a person to place 
himself suddenly in the cartway of a busy high-
way, with on-coming traffic close by, where a 
false step by him or a slight deviation of the 
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course of a vehicle n1ight cause his serious injury 
or death, eonstitutes eonduct that can only be 
regarded as being grossly careless and negligent. 
,.. ,.. ,.. r nquestionably the conduct of Dr. Heath 
eontributed Inaterially to the accident, and, * * * 
we are bound to enter judgment for defendant." 
The following language frmn the Supreme Court 
of \Yisconsin in the case of Brickell v. Tredwr, 176 \Vis. 
557, 186 K.\Y. 593, is applicable with equal force to the 
facts in the case at bar: 
"rpon any conceivable construction of the 
evidence, the plaintiff had ample and unobstruct-
ed opporhmity to discover the defendant's car 
in tin1e to have avoided the injury. She could 
have discovered the on-coming car as soon as the 
defendant could have discovered her. If the de-
fendant was guilty of negligence in not discover-
ing plaintiff before she did, the plaintiff was also 
guilty of negligence in not discovering the car 
of defendant before it was within five feet of her. 
From this conclusion we can see no escape." 
(Italics ours). 
See also the language of the court in Levesque v. 
Dumont, 116l\Ie. 25, 99 Atl. 719: 
"We are satisfied from a careful examination 
of the evidence that plaintiff's intestate at the 
time of the accident was not in the exercise of 
such care as ordinarily careful boys of his age 
and intelligence are accustomed to exercise under 
like circumstances. He started to cross a public 
city street frequented by teams and autos. Had 
he looked up the street, he must have seen the 
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car approaching, and, had he been attentive, he 
must have seen the lights projecting their rays 
by the rear of the team in season to have avoided 
his peril. Heedlessly he passed into the path of 
the car, so near to it that the accident could not 
be avoided." 
In Tolmie v. Woodward Taxicab Co., 178 Mich. 426, 
144 N. W. 855, the court said: 
"Under the conditions described by himself, 
with good eyesight and his wits about him, it 
seems impossible that plaintiff could not have 
seen the danger in time to avoid it, had he been 
reasonably alert and used his eyes and ears as 
the average reasonably prudent and cautious man 
should and would under like circumstances, and 
as his companions did. Instead of showing ab-
sence of contributory negligence, his evidence 
shows its presence. 
* * * * 
"Here, under the undisputed conditions sur-
rounding the accident and eliminating all issues 
of fact which conflicting evidence raises, plain-
tiff's own testimony shows that he failed to use 
his senses and exercise that reasonable degree 
of care to avoid injury, proportionate to the cir-
cumstances which the law makes essential to 
recovery, and by his own carelessness and negH-
gence contributed to the same." 
In the case of Pomeroy v. Dykema, 256 :Mich. 100, 
239 N.W. 342, the defendant, proceeding along the street, 
turned to the left to pass around a truck parked against 
the right hand curb in such fashion that it protruded 
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nearly to the center line of the street. After clearing the 
truck defendant turned again to the right and struck 
the deceased who was attmnpting to cross the street 
from behind the parked truck. The defendant did not 
realize he had struck a pedestrian until he was so advised 
by a passenger in his car. As in the instant case the 
marks of impact were on the right side of the defendant's 
car rather than on the front. The court held the deceased 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
saying: 
"Careful consideration of the record con-
vinces us that plaintiff's decedent attempted to 
cross the street, and in passing opposite the park-
ed truck he walked or ran into the side of defen-
dant's car, and in so doing he was guilty of con-
tributory negligence." 
In the case of Oldroyd v. W. W. Kirby & Son, 317 
Pa. 220, 176 Atl. 203, the plaintiff stepped from in front 
of a trolley car and into the side of defendant's passing 
truck. The court held plaintiff guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law and said: 
"It was clear daylight, and, if appellant had 
been looking, he must have seen and avoided con-
tact with the passing machine; his failure to look 
was, as a matter of law, contributory negligence." 
A similar case_ is MacDiarmid Candy Co. v. Schwartz, 
110. App. 303. 
In the case of Cooper v. American Can Co., 130 Me. 
76, 153 Atl. 889, the court used this language: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
"Under the rule requiring every user of the 
highway to exercise reasonable care for his own 
safety and protection * * *, a pedestrian crossing 
or about to cross a street or highway when his 
view of an approaching motor vehicle is ob-
structed, is usually required to exercise a greater 
degree of care than would under other circum-
stances be necessary * * *, and is negligent if he 
fails to take proper precautions to discover and 
observe the approach of such vehicle before plac-
ing himself in a position of danger. [Citations] 
* * .. 
"And the question of contributory negligence 
1nust be determined without regard to any negli-
gence on the part of defendant. Giving to plain-
tiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally 
entitled, and resolving every reasonable inference 
which may be drawn therefrom in favor of plain-
tiff, the inevitable conclusion must be that Mr. 
Crosby negligently left his place of safety in 
the obscurity of the loaded truck and stepped 
directly into the path of the moving auto." 
Afiler citing and discussing many of the cases on the 
question here under discussion, the court concluded as 
follows: 
"In the case at bar the injured person was 
a man of 65 years, in the full possession of his 
faculties. 
"In the light of all the circumstances, and 
with the law as expressed herein, we cannot predi-
cate· the jury verdict on sound premises. The 
pedestrian was negligent, even to the degree of 
exercising no care for his safety. His negligence 
continued up to the moment of impact, and, as in 
Levesque v. Dumont, recovery is barred." 
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See also the language of the court in Deal v. Snyder, 
203 :\Iich. 273, 168 N.W. 973: 
"When plaintiff admits that the slightest 
glance upon his part would have averted the acci-
dent, the law cannot aid him, even against one 
who is concededly negligent." 
The language of the court in Doyle v. Boston Ele-
vated Ry., 2-±S Mass. 89, 142 N.E. 693, is also applicable 
to the case at bar : 
"The undisputed, indisputable e·vidence com-
ing from and binding the plaintiff brings this 
case within the rule laid down where the person 
injured has stepped from behind of an object in 
a street in front of another, either without look-
ing or listening. The law is established that on 
such evidence as is here presented the contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff is proved as a 
matter of law, and it is the duty of the court to 
direct a verdict for the defendant." 
Pedestrians and motorists have equal rights to the 
use of the highway and both must use them with regard 
to the rights of the other. The rule is stated by Blashfield 
~ as follows : 
~ 
1 ) 
"In other words, motorists and pedestrians 
have the same rights to the use of the street or 
highway, and both are bound to exercise reason-
able and ordinary care and must exercise their 
rights with due regard to the rights of the other." 
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, Sec-
tion 1241. 
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The rule has been rcognized and followed in this 
state. 
In Mingus v. Olsson (Ut.), 201 Pac. (2d) 495, this 
court said: 
"The rights of pedestrians to the use of the 
public streets are the same as those of motorists 
-neither greater nor less. Hence, the same gen-
eral duties devolve upon them. A pedestrian 
crossing a public street in a crosswalk or pedes-
trian lane, although he may have the right of way 
over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the dut~· 
to observe for such traffic. Clearly, decedent 
neglected that duty in this case. It follows that 
he was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law. Of course we do not mean to imply that a 
mere glance in the direction of the approaching 
automobile would suffice. The duty to look has 
inherent in it the duty to see what is there to be 
seen, and to pay heed to it." 
We also invite the attention of the Court to the 
excellent discussion of the rule, particularly as it per-
tains to cases having facts like those in the case at bar, 
in Huddy, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 9th Ed. Yols. 
5 and 6, Sec. 7 4, p. 119, Sees. 88 and 89, pp. 154 and 155. 
We quote as follows : 
Sec. 7 4, page 119: "Pedestrians have equal 
rights on streets and highways, with automobiles, 
and, when using the highway, must exercise rea-
sonable care for their own safet~·, that is to say, 
the pedestrian must use such care for his ovvn 
safety as a reasonably prudent man would exer-
cise under the same circumstances." 
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~er. SS, page 15-!: .. If a pedestrian walks or 
runs against a 1noving autmnobile whieh is readily 
obserYa.ble, it n1ay be taken for granted that he 
did not see the car. On this assumption, he is 
guilty of negligence either (1) because he did 
not look for approaching automobiles or (2) 
because, if he looked, his observation was so 
careless and inattentive that he did not see the 
car in question." 
Page 155 : '·One who suddenly places himself 
immediately in front of a 1noving automobile 
which is readily observable is generally guilty of 
negligence per se." 
Sec. 89, page 155: "The rule· requiring a 
pedestrian to look for approaching automobiles 
applies where a person alighting from another 
vehicle steps into the roadway. If he fails to 
look for approaching cars or fails to observe 
them, he cannot as a rule recover for InJuries 
inflicted by a car running into him." 
It appears from the opinion of the Court that it is 
convinced from its study of the record that the deceased 
did not look and did not see. It follows as a necessary 
consequence under the well established law that the 
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence which 
bars any recovery by the plaintiff for his death. No 
valid reason has been suggested and none occurs to us 
as to why this result should not follow. Our State Legis-
lature has specifically provided that no pedestrian shall 
suddenly step from a place of safety into the path of 
an approaching automobile. The reason for the rule 
appears to be patent enough. Without statutory pro~ 
vision, it has been followed as the rule of decision by 
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practically every appellate court in the United States. 
Even in the absence of a legislative mandate there would 
appear to be no reason why this Court should not also 
adhere to the rule. It has the judicial sanction of many 
of the most respected courts of the land and also of 
leading text writers in the field. If for some obscure 
reason the rule is not to be followed in this state it would 
seem that this Court should by clear opinion so advise 
the trial bench and bar so that other courts and lawyers 
will not be led into error. 
CONCLUSION 
The court has failed to decide all of the issues of 
law presented on appeal. The Court erroneously held 
that the instruction on assumption of risk was prejudicial 
error. The Court likewise committed error in failing 
to hold that the plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden 
of proving that the death of deceased proximately re-
sulted from negligence imputable to the defendants. 
The Court particularly erred in failing to hold that 
the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. 
For the foregoing reasons the respondents are en-
titled to a rehearing, and upon rehearing being granted, 
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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